As we approach the Spring/Easter season in this seemingly accelerating new year, we'll devote the next several weeks taking a look at the case for the historical Jesus, the possibility of miracles, the basic reliability of the New Testament documents, and an argument for the resurrection of Jesus.

No greater influence on Resurrection studies has permeated our thought processes more than our biases and presuppositions that we carry with us into the issue. Although we may dismiss such bias as only a "default" setting in our intellects, we no doubt would harm any objective studies we begin with a hopeful conclusion already in mind. Now, I do not suppose that assumptions and presuppositions can be eradicated at the outset. Instead, I wish to encourage a sort of suspension of religious claims as claims of extraordinary knowledge. In order to judge fairly the truth about the Resurrection of Jesus, we need to be prepared to deal with the historical explanation that best fits the facts. During the trial of Galileo, his opponents viewed the Copernican cosmology so outrageous that intense discipline was to be sought. To the embarrassment of shallow-minded critics, the Copernican cosmology turned out to be true. Let us view the historical evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus from an objective standpoint and match the results with our preconceptions. If the evidence demands that a Resurrection took place, then non-Christians need to be prepared to "look through the telescope" of history and intimate this truth into their world view.

The first presupposition that needs to be jettisoned is the view of naturalism (or anti-supernaturalism). Naturalism supposes that the only events that can occur in history are purely physical, natural ones. Of course this precludes even the possibility of any supernatural events in the history of the universe. Once someone's mind is exclusive to explanations that posit natural elements then a Resurrection of any sort is barred a priori. Naturalism is a self-contained rejection of the supernatural. It makes no difference to the naturalist what evidence exists for the Resurrection. The conclusion is always the same, namely that there must be some natural explanation which prima facie carries greater probability than any well-demonstrated supernatural explanation. Now, I think the bite of naturalism can be withdrawn immediately. The issue of Jesus' Resurrection is not one that surmises a spontaneous regeneration of dead cells in the body of Jesus. Instead, the explanation that is being considered is that God raised Jesus from the dead. With a theistic backdrop to the question of Jesus' Resurrection, naturalism no longer enjoys its restricted world view. Who is to say that God raising Jesus from the dead is an overall impossible event? Although it is naturally impossible, it is not generally impossible for a resurrection to occur. This means that we must consider the evidence instead of the presupposition of naturalism in the face of the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Another presupposition that needs to be addressed is the notion that miracles contradict God's instituted natural laws.

Miracles, as classically understood by religious thinkers, center around the concept of suspending the law(s) of nature. This is to say that when a miracle occurs, it is the direct result of God acting in the world. Often, miracles are caricatured as divine acts of naturalistic rape whereby God is perceived as some sort of violator of Mother Nature. But if miracles are really suspensions and not violations then we have some context for God's morally permissible operative network. This raises the question about the purpose of miracles. It seems that if God desired to produce a miraculous event then he would have formed the laws of physics to conform to that event happening at the designated time. God could just create a natural law that would be time-delayed as to cause a desired event to happen some time down the road. For example, erosion is a time-delayed law that requires that an erodible substance be exposed to the elements of nature for a period of time. In order for erosion to be actualized in a substance, a certain amount of time must have transpired. So substance X can be eroded at time t where t is the desired time of God's plan for X. But I think this objection misses the point of miraculous events. A miracle occurs in the context of God as an extraordinary event with the intention of vindicating the power of God. If God used natural law to accomplish miracles then such events would not be anything but scientifically expected and explained. This is the case with cosmology. Many scientists and astronomers suppose that our life-permitting universe exists as the result of a quantum singularity. This advances the flexibility for atheists to explain the universe as being without a cause. If God did use quantum mechanics to create the universe, then he has done so with only a subtle metaphysical trace. This provides no scenario to command the necessary attention to the act and is why extraordinary causation within the physical world is necessary for miraculous events. Standard, scientific events offer no higher degree of attention. If God caused ocean tides to rise by using the moon then there would be very little attention to such an event.

One final philosophical consideration needs to be considered. It may be the case that there is no possible world where a miracle occurs except through direct divine interaction. This would mean that God could not have caused Jesus to rise from the dead without directly causing it. If this is true, and we have no way of demonstrating it either way, then perhaps the only technique God could use to maximize the number of desired believers in the history of the world is to enact miraculous intervention. It would seem that in order for one to opt for a natural law to provide the same effect, one would have to prove that the same desired effect would ensue under those conditions. That is surely an impossible feat. With this in mind, let us now take a look at why certain anti-miracle thinkers have rejected the possibility of the Resurrection of Jesus.

A. David Hume

Perhaps no bolder figure in history has been invoked more on the impossibility of miracles than the eighteenth-century skeptic David Hume. In Hume's works we are given a twofold argument against the possibility of miracles. First, Hume argues that our "firm and unalterable experience" militates against the reality of miracles (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York: Liberal Arts, 1955), 10.1.18, pp. 120-23).  Any claim of miraculous intervention, therefore, must be matched with our uniform experience and weighed appropriately. Therefore, any miracle claim will be disconfirmed by our "firm and unalterable experience" on the matter. Hume's second argument deals with the factual improbability of miracles. That even though the principle is sufficient to render miracles impossible, it is in fact true that miracles have never occurred in human history because any natural explanation outweighs a supernatural one. Thus anyone examining the historical evidence surrounding a miracle claim will conclude that something else must be the better explanation.

Hume's first argument has been recognized to be a classic case of petitio principii (begging the question) because Hume begins by assuming that our "firm and unalterable experience" already excludes a history of miracles. It is only when he assumes that our uniform experience does not involve the miraculous can he conclude that miracles never occurred. But surely this is putting the cart before the horse. Secondly, one can disavow Hume's approach even if we suppose that he means to suggest that an improbability yields a disconfirming conclusion. There are no good reasons to suppose that because an event is improbable that it is, therefore, impossible. If one were to argue for the improbability of an event then such evidence would have to include that event as the best explanation of the surrounding facts. So one must now ask, With respect to what is the notion of miracles improbable? If anyone is to confidently conclude a high improbability of a miraculous claim then the arguer owes it to the Christian to supply the backdrop of the improbability. For example,

(1) There is a high probability that the bean I select from the can will be black.

Let us think of two scenarios where the probability can be assessed:

(2) There are beans in the can such that 95% of them do not appear black.

(3) There are coffee beans in the can such that 99% of them appear black.

When we assess the probability of (1) with respect to (2) the bean selected will more than likely not be a black one. However, with respect to (3) the odds change and the probability of a black bean being selected from the can is high. So (1) is probable with respect to (3) but not so probable with respect to (2). In the case of Hume's anti-miraculous improbability calculus, we might see the probability of the miraculous in two respects:

(4) There appear to be no miracles discovered by most people throughout history.

(5) There appear to be miracles discovered by most people who were

Jewish disciples living in first century Palestine.

Hume's objection may be quite probable (that miracles are improbable with respect to the general consensus) with respect to (4) but lacks the proper background necessary to assess the miraculous claim. With respect to (5) the miracle in question becomes highly probable (if the miracle were to be, say, the Resurrection of Jesus). So if Hume argues for a probability based on all events weighed against the few miracle claims of antiquity then one should not wonder why miracles seem improbable with respect to those. But the miracle-believing theist can argue that the probability calculus needs to focus in on the specific background of the specific miraculous claim. The same would be true for a unique event as the American Civil War. If I said that the claim of an American Civil War is improbable because most events in human history do not include Civil War events then I would not be so far off. But if I stipulated that a Civil War is probable with respect to American history in the 1860's then no one should think inauspiciously of the claim.

Thus, one can see Hume's attack on miracles as a principle against the miraculous and also as a preface that no such miracle stories are in fact true. But as we saw there is no reason to opt for the principle because it begs the question and offers no reason to suppose that miracles are in fact improbable with respect to the relevant background information. If the miracle of the Resurrection did not occur on grounds of a Humean improbability, I find it incumbent upon the critic to supply the background information that suggests the improbability and to defend why it is sufficiently relevant to disavow it.

B. Antony Flew

Contemporary attackers of the claims to the miraculous suggest a new twist to the Humean problem. Instead of dealing with probabilities based on historical observation they surmise an analogy between the present state of affairs with that of history. This is to say that the regularities of today's events must be consistent with the regularities of history. For example, there are no observations of mermaids in today's world and none seem physically possible. Thus, one ought not to think that a mermaid may have been observed by a 19^th century seagoing captain simply because no confirmations of mermaids subsist. Captains probably mistook manatees for mermaids. The only difference between Antony Flew and Hume, in this respect, is that uniform experience consists of only one's current experiential data. Flew posits a similar construction that bases its assessment of miracle claims on the general experience of the modern man. Flew calls this the "critical history" approach (See Antony Flew, "Miracles," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967)).  He contends that no good historian can adequately do good history unless claims that contradict contemporary experience are disposed of. Presumably no contemporary experience involves the miraculous.

The issue that has to be dealt with is whether or not Flew's methodology is true given the historical analogy to contemporary events. By way of evaluation, I think there are several problems with Flew's defense. First, analogical arguments are probabilistic in that they do not claim identity but merely claim verisimilitude. For example, laboratory testing on mice may give analogous effects to human responses but the fact remains that mice are not human beings. Analogies, in this respect, serve to conclude the probability of a hypothesis based upon relevant similarities. So, even if we can agree with Flew that an analogy is warranted (as I believe it is) then the analogy serves to undergird the relevant factors of today with those of history. Now the question becomes, "What relevance do contemporary events have with miraculous events of history?" The Christian could appropriately deny the connection while pleading for the uniqueness of historical, miraculous events. Secondly, it appears that Flew is special pleading. Miraculous events are generally not repeated events and are very much unlike standard events as we see both in history and today. Why should non-unique events be disqualified by the analogy of today if an event, by definition, is infrequent? In this respect, Flew's argument appears to take on a Humean flavor by making a special methodology already suited for the non-believer in miracles. But this is precisely what is at issue. Thirdly, Flew believes (like Hume) that miracles are impossible events in principle. But as with Hume, this is question-begging. Fourthly, if Flew were correct then there would be no historiographical fecundity. Something is said to be fecund if it opens the doors to further investigation in additional areas. Flew's analysis certainly precludes this sort of methodology and does not open the door to any unique investigations. Finally, Flew's analysis is a resurgence of the late German theologian Ernst Troeltsch who advocated a similar "principle of analogy" which appears to badly falsify historical claims of the miraculous. The problem with a Flew/Troeltsch historiography is that it fails to affirm an analogy and, at best, can only disconfirm the non-analogous. So in order for analogy to be properly viewed with respect to history it must explain, for example, how the Resurrection appearances are analogous to, say, mass hallucinations. It does no good to suggest that a miraculous claim of history is non-analogous to a current event because it may very well be a unique and unprecedented occurrence. And if one sees the miracle claim of the Resurrection that God raised Jesus from the dead, I should hardly think ill of the probability of that.

Therefore, I think that Flew's methodology is faulty for its misplaced falsification. It makes no sense to disconfirm a miraculous event by question-begging or faulting the miraculous claim simply because it is unusual. If one maintains a principle of analogy then it ought to be one that sees analogy between the historical event in question with an event of today. Only in this fashion can the miraculous be properly analyzed.

As we venture into the argument for the Resurrection, the only palatable and proper assumptions that can be imported are not assumptions that disconfirm the possibility of miracles at the outset. That is assuming what needs to be proven. Instead, one must enter into the historical mindset from an open and proper standpoint. If explanations are ruled out of court before the jury has a chance to hear them, then how can we ever hope to comb the entire pool of options and opt for the best one? As John Lancaster Spalding once remarked, "Our prejudices are like physical infirmities - we cannot do what they prevent us from doing."

Next time we'll explore the basic outline for the argument for the resurrection of Jesus.