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I was talking to someone the other day that said that nearly or virtually all scientists believe that the universe is infinite. After reading you and William Lane Craig, I just found that hard to believe, since all the scientific evidence available seems to support Kalam\'s 2nd premise. Come to think of it, all he was doing was proposing rival models against the Big Bang model and leaving it at that. I guess my question is: could you provide a list of scientists who do not believe the universe is infinite? My correspondent said that Hawking believed the universe was infinite, but I remember reading a quote from Hawking in Craig\'s works in which Hawking said that almost everyone now believe the universe had a beginning in the Big Bang. Is my correspondent talking about the model in which Hawking plugs in imaginary numbers into the field equations for the General Theory of Relativity?
Penrose said this about Hawking: \"As it happens, he holds to no religious doctrine. But in an interview, he said his theory of aeons, in which the universe endlessly expands and collapses, from big bang to big crunch and over again, is "a bit more like Hindu philosophy" than the standard Big Bang story, which itself fit so perfectly with the Judeo-Christian account of God spontaneously creating the universe ex nihilo, out of nothing.\"
ONE MORE QUESTION: What is the difference between saying that we have an open universe, and saying that the universe is a closed system?
I ask because my correspondent says that the majority of scientists believe the universe to be an open system, or perhaps the softer claim that there is no good reason to think the universe is a closed system. I can\'t understand this, because if the universe is not a closed system, then the laws of thermodynamics can\'t apply to it, right? These are excellent questions and careful observations on your part. Some people would like to simply herald a list of scientists (without specific names sometimes) as if all believed the universe to be infinite. Ironically, it's easier to compile a list of scientists who assert the universe is infinite rather than finite since there are fewer of them. Among them would be Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok in their deeply controversial theory of the Ekpyrotic (e.g., the New Cyclical/Membrane) Model based on superstring theory. I am in the process of updating my work "Theism and Contemporary Cosmology" to include discussions about this model among others and its conceptual deficits (posited not by me but by eminent astrophysicists in the field, e.g., Brian Green). As of 2003, the notable astrophysicists Alan Guth, Arvind Borde, and Alexander Vilenkin have assessed modern cosmological theories in terms of a theorem that applies to all models. Their conclusion is a knock-down case against the universe being infinite - including the Steinhardt-Turok model! The reigning theory - an Inflationary Model - is Guth's pet project and he admits that inflation or not, the universe will ultimately need to have a singularity one way or the other. The conclusion is that the universe is not holding out any promising victory for an infinitely old universe regardless whether we gravitate toward some form of Inflationary model or Membrane model. The Hartle-Hawking model evinces a finite universe but one that is unbounded - very much like a donut. This is to say that the universe has no beginning point anymore than a sphere has a beginning point, but yet the sphere, donut, and universe are finite. The difficulties of their model abound, but the most absurd is their cheating of using Feynman's sum-over-histories formula and using "imaginary" numbers in the equations to make the singularity magically vanish. Well, that's all well and good on paper but in the actual world there are no "imaginary" numbers anymore than there are "imaginary" inches or "imaginary" miles-per-hour (try getting out of a speeding ticket on that one!). Finally, when cosmologists and astrophysicists speak of an "open universe" they aren't talking about the universe as a system (like in the Laws of Thermodynamics). Rather, they are talking about the universe having an expansion velocity that exceeds the inter-galaxial gravitational pull. As such, nothing will reverse the escape velocity and all matter and energy will eventually dissipate and fizzle out becoming a corpse of a universe. Theists can maintain that, in a matter of speaking, the universe is an open system in this case as well as in the Thermodynamic case - where God can put in and take out energy at will (e.g., miracles). But whether the universe is open or closed in this way is of relative indifference. Actually, if a discovery that energy were being put into the universe from an external source might turn the heads of those like Lee Smolin or Andre Linde who suggest that a meta-universe or hyper-universe exists in which ours appears as a "baby universe." Beyond such implications, little of interest would be garnered from such a discovery. God bless and keep up the good conversation with your correspondent!
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Hi Shandon, Thank you for your very interesting website. Having just read your essay about the Kalam Cosmological Argument (henceforth the KCA), I had a few questions I wanted to ask you if you don't mind! I am of the view that the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation when it comes to the term 'begins to exist'. If I may ask, how is 'begins to exist' being defined in this argument, and does this same definition of 'begins to exist' apply in both the premises (1 and 2)? It seems, as per the KCA, in premise one 'begins to exist' refers to things changing forms (like how a computer begins to exist after assembling prior existing parts, which parts themselves were made from other simpler materials, etc..). This is the kind of 'begins to exist' that appeals to our intuitions, and we observe this happening everyday for things around us. Therefore your contention "the premise that everything which begins to exist has a cause for its existence seems to be a well-established principle underscored by experience," makes sense if by 'begins to exist' you mean that we observe objects arising through the changing of forms of pre-existing materials. Meanwhile, in Premise 2 'begins to exist' seems to refer to something 'popping into existance FROM NOTHING'. This is the kind of 'begins to exist' (i.e. popped into existence out of nothing) that KCA proponents,like yourself, seem to want to apply to the universe. You can now see where the problem arises. It becomes apparent that the phrase 'beginning to exist' has a particular definition when used in Premise 1 (changing forms of pre-existing matter), and a different one for Premise 2 (popping into existence out of nothing). The definitions are different! Is this not equivocation? If we decided to stick with one definition for 'begins to exist', and apply it to both premises, then doesn't the KCA kind of lose meaning? Try it and see. Define the phrase 'begins to exist', and in place of that phrase insert its definition in both the premises, and take a look at how the argument turns out. I'd like to know your thoughts on that. Thanks. RU I appreciate the question and I hope your exploration into this issue takes you further than this exchange. The expression "begins to exist" conveys a univocal understanding of "at some moment, we have being from non-being" (or, more technically, it's "being at t1 where there was no being at t-1"). Nothing in this commits us to defining this as the rearrangement of matter or as something that has arisen ex nihilo (out of nothing). In the charge of equivocation, you're concentrating on where the "being" has come from rather than the fact that there is new being. This is something Aristotle himself explains in his discussion of the Four Causes. On the one hand a material cause refers to the matter from which the new being was fashioned. On the other hand the formal cause refers to the identify the new being has taken on. Now, fundamentally, these are two different kinds of causes but they are both univocal with respect to the fact that there exists something new at t1 whereas it didn't at t-1. By "begins to exist" then we mean only the latter understanding of something's new existence from which previously it did not exist – which is truth both of things that begin to exist ex nihilo and things that begin to exist from material causes. I hope this helps! ___________________________________________ Thank you so much for the response! I didn't think you'd get back to me so quickly - much appreciated. I also wanted to say I had a chance to listen to your interview on the Infidel Guy show, and I thought you articulated your position very well (even though I disagree). About the KCA - I think you gave a very interesting answer to the question I asked regarding the possible equivocation going on with how 'begins to exist' was being defined. On the face of it, it does appear to be a compelling explanation. I intend to digest your explanation for a while so I can fully understand its implications. I hope you won't feel disturbed if I send another query you way, in case I need further clarification. Thanks again, for taking the time to respond. RU
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I appreciate your willingness to help me understand better the Molinist position. Also, thank you for the links. If you do not mind, I would like to start with some simple definitions. (Note: ‘C’ is the set of “all influences not intrinsic to person A’s will.”)Libertarian Free Will (Def. 1): Person A performs action X given circumstance C with libertarian free will if and only if C does not constitute a set of influences sufficient to cause person A to perform action X. Here is another definition in terms of possible world theory… Libertarian Free Will (Def. 2): Person A performs action X given circumstance C with libertarian free will if and only if there exists a possible world where person A freely performs action ¬X given circumstance C. Shandon, given these two definitions, do you see them as equivalent? If not, why? Also, do you agree with any of the two definitions? If not, would you mind proposing a definition you do agree with? Sincerely, Brian First, I am suspicious of the first definition offered - that C never engenders any sufficient causes for some person to perform some action. On the contrary, God intimates circumstances precisely because He knows what conditions are sufficient to bring about some desired result. What we want to avoid here is determinism (which is why "sufficient" appears), but yet God could still guarantee some result if He knows what each person will do under any circumstance. In this case, such causal circumstances could be rendered as "sufficient" nonetheless. Thus, I would caution the revisionist scheme there.
Secondly, the latter definition is more or less on the right track. I might include the disjunction of behavior as "A person is free just in case she can either do X or ~X" or some variant.
I hope this helps! __________________________________ First, I am suspicious of the first definition offered - that C never engenders any sufficient causes for some person to perform some action. On the contrary, God intimates circumstances precisely because He knows what conditions are sufficient to bring about some desired result.
I think the definition I (Brian) proposed was more along the lines of “any sufficient influences that would cause someone to perform some action.” This seems to be a little different than saying that C never provides “sufficient causes for some person to perform some action.” I certainly want C to provide sufficient conditions for A to do X. I just don’t want C to be such that A necessarily does X. In terms of someone having libertarian freewill concerning action X relative to circumstance C, person A is able to do X and is able to do ¬X. Neither action is necessary. The idea here is that circumstance C makes it sufficient for person A to do X – not necessary for person A to do X. If C makes it necessary for person A to do X, then person A does not have libertarian freewill regarding action X in circumstance C. Is this consistent with your thinking? What we want to avoid here is determinism (which is why "sufficient" appears), but yet God could still guarantee some result if He knows what each person will do under any circumstance. In this case, such causal circumstances could be rendered as "sufficient" nonetheless. I am a little confused by this. I get that we want to avoid determinism. Regarding our definitions, I don’t follow you when you say, “God could still guarantee some result if He knows what each person will do under any circumstance.” My understanding of God’s foreknowledge (God guaranteeing some result) in the Molinist system is that He foreknows that person A in circumstance C does X precisely because He actuated the possible world where person A does X in circumstance C. Libertarian freewill is preserved because there exists a possible world where person A in circumstance C does ¬X even though God chose not to actualize this possible world. Am I wrong here? Secondly, the latter definition is more or less on the right track. I might include the disjunction of behavior as "A person is free just in case she can either do X or ~X" or some variant. Cool. I still see the two definitions being the same, but I, too, prefer the latter definition. Is the following consistent with your disjunction of behavior? Person A in circumstance C has libertarian freewill concerning action X, if and only if there exists a possible world where person A in circumstance C performs action X and there exists a possible world where person A in circumstance C performs a different action, i.e., they do ¬X. If you like this, then let’s use it as our official definition. If it is lacking, then please feel free to correct it. Sincerely,
Brian I figured your clarification was what you had in mind, but I simply wanted to avoid the perils of Calvinists who demand that given the same sufficiency of C for A to do X, nonetheless A is free to do X or not. In short, we're on the same page here.
Regarding what you said here:
My understanding of God’s foreknowledge (God guaranteeing some result) in the Molinist system is that He foreknows that person A in circumstance C does X precisely because He actuated the possible world where person A does X in circumstance C. Libertarian freewill is preserved because there exists a possible world where person A in circumstance C does ¬X even though God chose not to actualize this possible world. Am I wrong here?
you're correct again. The "guarantee" comes from God's natural knowledge and His middle knowledge such that God knows what it would take for A to freely do X (where logically prior God knows what is possible for A to do) and then can actualize such a world. So this description is dead-on.
Any follow-ups to this? ________________________________________ Thanks for the clarification. I (Brian) feel good that I am understanding these things correctly from the Molinist viewpoint. Before I get to my main question, allow me to check my understanding on one more very important Molinist distinction – that of Middle Knowledge itself. Natural Knowledge (NK): Natural knowledge is that knowledge God has based on His very nature. It includes all necessary truths. For instance, the laws of logic would be part of God’s NK. The set of all possible worlds would be included in this. All mathematical truths would be part of this. A key point for Molinists regarding KN is the it is knowledge independent of God’s will – that is to say, it is “pre-volitional”. For example, God did not will the law of non-contradiction. Rather, the law of non-contradiction is part of God’s essence. NK is grounded in the very nature of God. Free Knowledge (FN): Free knowledge is that knowledge that God has concerning what He wills. For instance, “It is possible that I exist” is true whether or not God creates me. That is to say, I do exist in some possible world even if God does not choose to actuate that world. However, the actuality that I exist depends upon God creating me, or more properly in God actualizing the possible worlds where I exist. All knowledge that is a result of God’s will is FK. It is “post-volitional” in nature. Middle Knowledge (MN): MN comes between FK and NK. One can see that NK is logically prior to FK. NK is not dependent upon God’s will. NK is necessary. FK is contingent. MK is said to come between God’s NK and His FK. The characteristic of MK is that it is not dependent upon God’s will (it is pre-volitional like NK) yet, it is contingent like FN. Specifically, MN is comprised of what creatures would do given a particular circumstance. Consider the statement, “If Brian Bosse emails Shandon Guthrie, then Shandon will respond.” This is true. However, it seems as if it is not necessarily so. It seems as if you could have easily chosen not to respond at all. Likewise, its truth does not seem to be dependent upon God’s will in the same way that the proposition “Brian Bosse exists” is. Whether or not I exist (or you for the matter), the proposition “If Brian Bosse emails Shandon Guthrie, then Shandon would respond” could still be true. Therefore, the truth of this proposition seems to depend on whether or not you (Shandon) choose to respond. In other words, its truth seems to be dependent upon your will.
Shandon, do I understand these distinctions correctly? There are some "touch ups" that might need to be offered here for fear of misunderstanding the full breadth of the position. First, God's natural knowledge engenders not just all necessary truths but also of all logically possible truths (notwithstanding the extent and scope of whether it be strictly or broadly logical possibility). Though not expressly stated, I think you had this in mind. God's free knowledge just is His foreknowledge. Thus, it is "post-volitional" in that God's free knowledge is constituted by what God will in fact do. It is, in short, knowledge of the actual world. Your comments about God's middle knowledge seem to be spot-on. Following is (perhaps) a helpful chart chronicling the Molinist model (though I might adjust the nomenclature "galaxy" to be "compossible world"):
____________________________________ Thank you for the “touch-ups.” This leads directly to where I do not think I properly understand Molinism and Middle Knowledge. The key statement in your email for me is: God’s natural knowledge engenders all logically possible truths. In terms of possible world theory, what does it mean to say a particular proposition is true? For example, what does it mean to say that “Germany lost WWII” is a true proposition? In one sense you could say this proposition is true because God actuated our particular possible world where Germany did in fact lose WWII. But one could argue that in another sense the proposition is false, namely, it is false in a possible world where Germany did not lose WWII. The point is that the proposition “Germany lost WWII” is a true proposition in only those possible worlds where Germany lost WWII. It seems that the truth or falsity of the proposition “Germany lost WWII” is relative to a particular possible world. In fact, all contingent truths are relative to a possible world. With that said, if God’s natural knowledge engenders all logically possible truths, then it seems to me that the set of all possible worlds is something that exists in God’s natural knowledge. In other words, God knows in His natural knowledge every possible world where the proposition “Germany won WWII” is true. Now, relating this to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, consider possible world P(1) where we know that Joe in circumstance C runs a red light. For this action to be free in the libertarian sense, we have already agreed that this means there exists another possible world, say P(2), where Joe in circumstance C does not run the red light. Now, I know the Molinist is concerned with propositions of the form “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light,” which supposedly are not necessary truths, but are contingent. But being contingent only means that their truth is relative to a possible world. At the very least, the proposition “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light” is false precisely in the case when Joe is in circumstance C and does not run a red light. This occurs in possible world P(2). In other words, given possible world P(2), the proposition “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light” is false. In P(1), it is true. Again, the truth of the proposition is relative to some possible world, and this possible world exists in God’s natural knowledge. The point here is that if God naturally knows all possible worlds, then God naturally knows the truth or falsity of all propositions of the form “The proposition X is true in possible world P(n).” If this is true, then there does not seem to be any place for middle knowledge. If this is false, then it seems the Molinist brings God’s omniscience into question.
Where have I run amuck? Thank you for your consideration. The key statement in your email for me is: God’s natural knowledge engenders all logically possible truths. In terms of possible world theory, what does it mean to say a particular proposition is true? For example, what does it mean to say that “Germany lost WWII” is a true proposition? In one sense you could say this proposition is true because God actuated our particular possible world where Germany did in fact lose WWII. But one could argue that in another sense the proposition is false, namely, it is false in a possible world where Germany did not lose WWII. The point is that the proposition “Germany lost WWII” is a true proposition in only those possible worlds where Germany lost WWII. It seems that the truth or falsity of the proposition “Germany lost WWII” is relative to a particular possible world. In fact, all contingent truths are relative to a possible world.
-- This question has been the subject of much controversy since Robert Adams first began critiquing Molinism. The question of what makes a contingent or counterfactual proposition true has re-ignited the truth-maker maximalism controversy (that the truths of all propositions must be grounded in concrete states of affairs) in contemporary epistemological circles. But I think Alvin Plantinga's statement gives a summary of the Molinist's counter-critique which evinces that its intuitive appeal is far more persuasive than the so-called "grounding objection" leveled against it:
It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way" (A. Plantinga, "Reply to Robert Adams," Alving Plantinga, ed. J.E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), p. 378).
Thomas Flint and Al Freddoso have proposed that such counterfactual truths may be grounded simply in those states of affairs that would obtain (like you've noted). Notre Dame Professor Alan Rhoda (http://www.alanrhoda.net/papers/Presentism,%20Truthmakers,%20and%20God.pdf) and I discussed his recent publication, "Presentism, Truthmakers, and God" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in responding to these (and other) counter-objections. His response to Molinism is more promising if and only if one believes in a dynamic theory of time (e.g., presentism). I've written to him some weaknesses in his solution and why Molinism nonetheless prevails. But never mind. The point here is simply that how such truth-makers are grounded has no bearing on the mere analysis that Molinism accedes the belief in counterfactuals that they are contingently true.
With that said, if God’s natural knowledge engenders all logically possible truths, then it seems to me that the set of all possible worlds is something that exists in God’s natural knowledge. In other words, God knows in His natural knowledge every possible world where the proposition “Germany won WWII” is true. Now, relating this to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, consider possible world P(1) where we know that Joe in circumstance C runs a red light. For this action to be free in the libertarian sense, we have already agreed that this means there exists another possible world, say P(2), where Joe in circumstance C does not run the red light. Now, I know the Molinist is concerned with propositions of the form “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light,” which supposedly are not necessary truths, but are contingent. But being contingent only means that their truth is relative to a possible world. At the very least, the proposition “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light” is false precisely in the case when Joe is in circumstance C and does not run a red light. This occurs in possible world P(2). In other words, given possible world P(2), the proposition “If Joe is put in circumstance C, then he will run the red light” is false. In P(1), it is true. Again, the truth of the proposition is relative to some possible world, and this possible world exists in God’s natural knowledge. The point here is that if God naturally knows all possible worlds, then God naturally knows the truth or falsity of all propositions of the form “The proposition X is true in possible world P(n).” If this is true, then there does not seem to be any place for middle knowledge. If this is false, then it seems the Molinist brings God’s omniscience into question.
-- It is also important to intimate into this discussion what it means to have a possible world and what it means to have an actualizable world. The two are not identical and to reduce all actualizable worlds to possible worlds - though it would certainly promote the paradox you've raised - would both trivialize Molinism and undercut all of its advantages in applied theology. Here is an example noted by Plantinga himself. Think of the proposition The Prime Minister is a prime number. This proposition is certainly logically possible and would perhaps be a world within God's noetic structure (e.g., natural knowledge); however, such a world is not actualizable (i.e., feasible) to create. Also consider an example I often use that concerns a free creature: Ivan will never freely enroll in a Philosophy 101 course under any circumstance. Now, God certainly has the natural knowledge of Ivan freely enrolling in Philosophy 101 (because it's logically conceivable); however, God knows via His middle knowledge the above proposition. Thus, God's decree and His subsequent free knowledge will never contain the proposition Ivan freely enrolls in Philosophy 101. So we have a filtering effect in the Molinist's paradigm: The total set of all that is possible (natural knowledge) trickles through the total set of all that is actualizable (middle knowledge) and eventually into the total set of what actually obtains (free knowledge). So I hope this somewhat clarifies rather than exacerbates the difficulty. |
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Does God allow random things to happen? Furthermore, I recently heard an author claim that only God can create a random number or a random process. I don't deny that this could be true, but how are we to reconcile the notion of randomness and that God is a purposeful being with a plan? Ultimately, an act or phenomenon might seem random to us, but if God allows it shouldn't there be meaning attached to it? Because I'm not an Open Theist, I have to say that true metaphysical randomness is not likely. And one's answer will ultimately be determined by what sort of physics one works by. In quantum mechanics, there are at least 8 different metaphysical interpretations of natural laws and principles (see  Nick Herbert's Quantum Reality) . On some views, there are truly random events not bound or determined by the constraints of physical laws and an entity's properties. However, God would still know "If entity E were put in situation S, then E would take on property P." Thus God would not create the circumstances of S if He did not wish for P to come about. However, the "causal matrix" for P to ensue may be random with respect to the physical constants and laws. But if randomness were being defined as "that which God could not determine" then I have to say that such randomness does not exist. Ultimately, this Molinist account will help us see how it is possible to have randomness with respect to all causal conditions but yet remain under the providence and sovereignty of God. I hope this helps! |
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Hi, I wonder if anyone here can point me to a good response to the arguments of Karen Armstrong's 'A History of God'? Needed for a conversation with unbeliever. Specifically about the Jewish conception of God changing over time thus clearly looking like a product of human imagination.
Thanks
Henry
Greetings, Henry. I'm not directly familiar with Armstrong's theses in her once-popular book A History of God though I am aware that it does engender the sentiment of a politically correct society. The thrust of your question seems to be: Is God the product of imagination since the concept of God seems to change over time? Now, I have to disagree with the essence of the premise here since it's not true that the primary attributes of God have changed (for example, God has always been construed as Creator, self-existent, eternal, invisible, all-powerful, all-knowing, ever-present, etc.). What has changed has been His revelation to us. This is to say, we only began to learn about God as He has gradually revealed Himself throughout Israel's history. For example, we did not know God as El-Shaddai until the Patriarchs came onto the scene. Moreover, we could argue further that we were unaware of the tri-personality of God until the New Testament. Now these are not evolutions of God's ontology but, rather, changes of how much has been revealed. And this is not a mark against the existence of God anymore than the fact that only recently did we come to appreciate that the earth is (roughly) spherical and that gravity may be due to subatomic particles called "gravitons." Changes in our perception at best only shows the growth of knowledge, not a change in the ontology of the referent. One additional point: Christian philosopher J.P. Moreland points out in his book Scaling the Secular City that if Israel's God is the product of human imagination, then why formulate Him to continuously judge and punish Israel for its sins? Just to cite one example, we read: 10:15 Thus it shall be done to you, O house of Israel, because of your great wickedness. In the storm the king of Israel shall be utterly cut off. It seems that if Israel were to create a god out of whole cloth then they most certainly would have made Yahweh like the deities of Rome or Greece such that this god would be the champion of Israel and not its most ardent critic!! Worse, when we get to the New Testament, the proverbial towel seems to be thrown in on Israel for Jesus "came unto his own people, and His people received him not" (John 1:11) only to end in Jesus' own crucifixion at the hands of "the Jews" (Acts 2:22-23). Again, no self-respecting Israelite would concoct a God who is in essence constantly judging, punishing, and admonishing Israel as a parent does with a stubborn child! Given the cultural backdrop of the nation of Israel in the Ancient Near East, we would presume that Israel would do exactly what her neighbors did (Sumerians, Akkadians, Egyptians, etc.) and devise a god who championed the causes of ethnic Israel and who even succumbed to the whims of the Israelite people (the frailty and malleability of the Sumerian-Babylonian gods are seen in the Epic of Gilgamesh - the gods quarreled among themselves and feared natural disasters!). But in every case Yahweh is Creator and Master over nature and answers to no one. As of today, Jewish and Christian philosophy continue to uphold these attributes of God such that they have not changed. Thus Armstrong’s thesis about such a God being the imagination of the Israelite people (if this is her view) is misguided and fallacious. I hope this helps! 
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